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STATE OF U Jf\Ll
-----

-

-----------------

OF UTAH,

~TATE

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 17335

MAX D. GILES,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This

appeal

is

from

the

decision

of

the

Third

Judicial Distrit Court denying the defendant's appeal from
a

criminal

conviction

the

in

First

Circuit

Court,

Coalville Department.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The
First

Circuit

Keller,
was

defendant-appellant
Court,

was

Coalville

found

guilty

Department,

by

in

the

Judge

of wreckless operation of a motor boat. An appeal

taken

from

the

judgment

to

the

District

Court

and

Judge David B. Dee confirmed the lower court's finding.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant

seeks to have this Court reverse the

decision of

the Circuit Court and

the District Court and

dismiss

criminal

was

the

charge

which

filed

against

the

appellant.
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On July
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to

graph

to

and

d -1 7 ( 3 ) .

copy

forth

forwarded

of

in

his

Office

receipted

Receipt

the

0318

money
1979,
$25. 00
of

was
the

bai 1

Fifth

received

Parks

and

and

fine.

Circuit

The

from

the

Recreation

one

check

1979,

p. 3)

Circu~:

avail~

para-

in the sum of

and
to

of

On

Clerk

with

and the

on August
the

Summit

$25. 00.
Court
to

That
and a

Mr.

that

Giles

the

September 30,
forwarded

to
other

the

the

Division

monies that
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the court received

defendant

along

p.

first

indicated

Court

l_ ~1 ;

v[olit

Ln

District

forwarded

( R. ,

'.;

Giles selected the

sum

receipt

The

~

c'

(Record,

Fifth Circuit
was

I

forfeited

Mr.

the

indicating that on August 15,
the $25.00 check.

be

personal

t

alternatives

paragraph

for

by

No.

p.2)

i l (-''.-.,

was ordered r 0

that he could post bail
would

c:

G.i.les in 1'Jhich r:Jr.

citation.

Clerk's
was

Max D.

the

set

X

•;peed

1•1.CJ.

resolve

(R.,

check

1

1 1,.. ,"

three

case would be closed.

County

r.

had

bail

1979,

fl[

the Fifth Jud1c1oil

that

12,

1

he

that

alternative

I~

I' j

by August 11.,

that

indicated

$25.00

'i (

\·;c1kl-'lf·c.';

Jct t:0r to Mr.

told

him

slob1

d

I

l97CJ,

Court mailed a
Giles

7

Cc"t(c

the

(j,

f,·/

i()I•

section

report to

t l l ,-_:

i ''

-.1ccept('cl
k .i :·

( rL E .

b/ th'CC Cui!cr either as
F: x

.

Linns

nc for-

i,' 1 )

r;· ;·he 31st c1ay of Qr·t.ob2r, 1979, th2 c;·•r:,;pit County
l\ttu, i·C'/'
is·"'

··I

c~

Office caus2c1 ''· Complaint and

ci<y1inst Max D.

G~lros

Su:nr~ons

to be

for wreckless ooeration of a

motoc vehicle in violation of section 73-18-12(1) at Echo
Res•,,i·oir on July 29, 1979.

(R., P.4)

This charge was for

the same factual situation on which the citation was issued.
The County Attorney conceded on the Court record that the
citation and the Complaint were for the same incident.
(Transcript, p.12)

The Court record will reflect that at

no time did the County Attorney's office make a motion to
amend the citation to allege wreckless operation of a boat.
The charge of wreckless operation of a motor boat was
set for trial before the Honorable Larry Keller for the 13th
day of February, 1980 at 9:30 A.M.

At the time of the trial

setting, the defendant, by and through his attorney, made a
motion before the Court asking that the Complaint charging
wreckless operation of a motor boat be dismissed because of
the single criminal episode statute contained in section
76-1-401 through 403, Utah Code Annotated.

(T., p.

4-7)

This motion was denied by Judge Keller on the basis that
the bail on the exceeding a wakeless speed had not been forfeited.

(T., p. 3&9) Judge Keller indicated that he had not

personally ap·proved the forfeiture and consequently, there
was no forfeiture of bail on that citation.

On the 19th day

of Ap1il, 1979, Judge Floyd H. Gowans, the presiding Judge
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of the Fiilh

01

May 7,

','i~, .. , i t

l'l/0_

(k_,

COULt,

iSSl'

:•r:

p.64-60) Thi1t

ci.c1rninis tr at 1 v0

tuil

schedule establi""'"0

bail for operJlln0 a motor boat in c
speed at $25.00.
After thc° Court denied the cl:' Eendant' s motion for dismissal based on L:he single crimina

I

episode, the def"ndant

made a motion before the Court that the charge of exceeding
a slow wakeless speed either be dismissed or tried before
the wreckless operation of a motor boat charge.

(T., p. 9

&

121

Judge Keller denied this motion on the basis that there was
no charge before his Court charging that the defendant had
exceeded a slow wakeless speed.

(T., p.10

&

13) The defendant

then moved the Court to return to the defendant his $25. 00,
but the Court denied this motion on the basis that the $25.00,
which was then in the hands of the Park and Recreation Department, was in fact bail for the wreckless operation of a motor
boat charge.

(T., p.17

&

18)

Prior to the actual trial of the case, the defendant
moved the Court for a dismissal of the action on the basis
that the statute under which the defendant was charged with
wreckless operation o~ a motor boat was unconstitutional~
vague.

The statute in question provided that a person was

guilty of wreckless operation of a motor boat if he operated
the motor boat in ·a wreckless or negligent manner.
motion was denied by the Judge.

(T.

I

p.18-21)
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This

hcc tcstimnny P'-";;'nted at the lr:icil
Ui,'

c!,

'llciant was op:cccttinq 1'1is motor bo'lt OL:ic,;icJ,_,

buo/s ,,;!ii,,-,.
docL
bo

indicated th2lc

('l'.,

1t \-;,i,;

thro~tle

mark~'d

the

1- 1

0f

th2

:ikc:cccss speed are:a s;1crounding the

p.86, L.10-lG,

p.63, L.10) Th8

~2fendant's

travelling at 0:Jproximately three-rparter
and the defendant was paralleling the docking

area outside of the buoys while he was observing the docks
to see if the trailer was in position so that he could remove
his boat from the water.

(T., p.86, L.17 through p.89, L.15)

The defendant and one of his passengers both testified that
they observed a boat ahead of them and to the right_motionless in the water and an individual attempting to put on
water skis.

The defendant then directed his attention back

to the dock and his trailer.

After looking in that direction

he again looked forward and was momentarily blinded by the
sun reflecting off his windshield.

(T., p.94, L.3 through

p.95, L.23) As soon as he could focus his eyes, he became
aware of the fact that the boat that had been sitting still
in the water had accelerated at a rapid speed and pulled
into his path.

(T., p.20, L.3-10, p.61, L.9 through p.64,

L.20; p.86, L.25 through p.87, L.12) About the time the
defendant became aware of this, his passenger also noticed
the boat and yelled for the defendant to change his course.
(T., p.55, t.

5 through p.57, L,16; p.61, L.6 through p.62,

L.14) The defendant then immediately turned his boat to the
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present ei th2r the operator of tivc other boat or the passensc:
of the

oth2~

boat.

The only witnesses available: 'or the pr 05 ,_

cut ion were the passenger of the defendant's bo"t, the water
skier and one of the water sLier's relatives w:10 had been
standing on the shore approximately 150 yards away.

The

water skier testified that he had not seen the defendant's
boat until the time of the impact.

(T., p. 67, L.13-18) The

state witnesses acknowledged that the boat that had been
stopped and the boat which was towing the water skier took
off at full speed and travelled into the path of the
defendant's boat.

(T., p.30,

L.3-10; p.61, L.9 throughp.64,

L.20; p.86, L.25 through p.87, L.12)
Judge David B. Dee, when reviewing this matter on
appeal, issued a Memorandum Decision in which he did not
comment on any of the facts or issues of law presented on
appeal except to state that
.the State is not prohibited from
prosecuting the defendant because of the
single criminal episode statute and that the
statute under which this defendant was tried
is not unconstitutionally vague nor was the
evidence insufficient to find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of violating
the statute in question.
A R G U ME N T
POINT I
THE DEFENDA..NT W/1-5 DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
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>1 -1~-~·

, :=.,

prohibited f.cfl!"'.1 subsequent pL-o.s2cut.j_o::1s if a per-

s·J'.1 11:.Lc been penal iz;-::d for an offense "1.risin'J out of the
S'l''''-

Section 76-1-401, Utah Code

criminal episode.

F~n~tated,

1953, as am nded, defines a single criminal
0

e?;sode as all conduct which is closely related in time
ancJ in incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a
single criminal object.

At the time of the trial before

the circuit court, Judge Keller stated on record that
there was no question but that exceeding a wakeless speed
and the wreckless operation of a motor boat were in fact
results of a single criminal episode.

(T., p. 6, L.14-23)

The county attorney did not content otherwise.

Judge

Keller, however, stated that he had not personally approved
the forfeiture and therefore, no jeopardy had attached
and consequently, the prosecution for the wreckless operation
of a motor boat was not prohibited.

(T., p.24 through p.?.S,

L.17)
As indicated in the Statement of Facts, the defendant
was sent a letter by the circuit court stating that he could
forfeit bail on the citation of exceeding a wakeless speed
and that the case would be closed.

In addition, the circuit

court had established a bail schedule by court order.

Pursuant

thereto the clerk of the court accepted the bail forwarded by
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took the mor;. y and presently hcLo it in its coffe1:.
0

Approxi-

mately one month thereafter the county attorney's office
issued a

ne~

complaint charginq wreckless operation of a

m~m

boat at the same time, place and based upon the same circumst;:
It is the position of the defendant that the State of
Utah is absolutely barred from instigating a separate cornplairin light of the fact that i t accepted a bail forfeiture on a
criminal citation which involved a single criminal episode.
It is also the position of the defendant that the judge harim
established a bail schedule and having authorized the clerk tc
forward a letter to defendants coming before the court authon:
them to forfeit bail cannot at a later date claim that the ba:
forfeiture has no
approve it.

consequences because he personally did not

It was an established practice of this circuit

court as well as all other circuit courts to allow bail fu~
feitures without personal approval of the individual judges.
It should be noted that the Parks and Recreation Department
still has the defendant's forfeited bail and to this date has
not returned i t to him.
After Judge Keller refused to dismiss the wreckless
operation charge as requested by the defendant, the defen~~
moved the court to either dismiss the exceeding a wakele 55
. c'
speed charge or to try it prior to the wreck less operation '
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,Judge Kelli.er

t !«2

court.

re~

f1ised to do so

Sectinn 77-11-9 indicates that a citation

1uich is filPd

\'1.Li~.h

the magistrate r:uy be used in lieu

of a complaint to which a person may plead guilty or on
which bail may be posted and forfeited.

The court has

ruled that the bail has not been forfeited on that citation
and has refused to either dismiss the citation or proceed
with a trial on it.

The court obviously made this ruling

because it realized that if the defendant was found guilty
on the citation or if the citation was dismissed, the court
would be prohibited from proceeding on the wreckless operation of a motor vehicle charge.

For some reason Judge Keller

had determined that the defendant would be tried on the latter
charge regardless of what the law or rules of procedure
had to say about the matter.
The evidence produced at the time of the trial
demonstrated that the defendant was operating his motor
boat outside of the wakeless area on Echo Reservoir. He was
proceeding in a direct line of traffic at a constant rate
of speed.

A boat which was towing a water skier was

sitting in the water to the defendant's right.

While the

defendant was in full view, the other boat started up and
pulled directly into the path of t~e defendant's vehicle
causing a collision between the defendant's boat and the
water skier being pulled by the other boat.

Based upon this
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.'I

thirty

day~;

~n

' --~

q

II

i_ l

ty

i ,1 i L.

It is the l'O-jition of thsc c1:'1:·,cndant thot ~Tud·.J-c Kcll~r',
actions und ,1udy~ Dee's confirTTlil~L"l of those Jctl.c,r1;; hy deny,
the defendant's ilppeal constitui-c a violation of the ck•fendant'
right of due rirocess of law as pre.Hided by both the state and
federal constitutions.
POINT II
THE STATUTE CHARGING THE DEFENDANT WITH WRECKLESS

OPEF!·

TION OF A MOTOR BOAT IN UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE.
Title 73, Chapter 18, Section 12-1, of the Utah Code
Annotated, states that a person is guilty of the wreckless
operation of a motor boat if he operates the motor boat ina
wreckless or negligent manner so as to endanger the life,
limb or property of another.
separate definitions.

This statute incorporates two

One is the wreckless operation of a

motor boat and the other is the negligent operation.

The

state code does not give any definition for wreckless or
negligent operation of a boat.

Consequently, it of necessity

incorporates the definitions of civil law negligence.

There

is a substantial difference between wreckless operation md
negligent operation.

The negligent operation of a boat

could include such things as failing to keep a proper lookout, failing to yield right-of-way and other violations which
under criminal law constitute lesser offenses which do n~
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th~

d2Jnndant cannot be pro3ecuted under

it n,· '.·,,nvictccl under it.

CONCLUSION
The Judge committed prejudicial error and denied the
ct~

,.,,,(!:mt his due process of law when he failed to dismiss the

wreckl2ss operation of a motor vehicle charge.

The Court

accepted and forfeited the defendant's bail on the citation
ctarging him with exceeding a wakeless speed and the wreckless
o;ieration of a motor boat charge grew out of a single criminal
episode, and was, therefore, barred by Section 76-1-403, Utah
Code Annotated.
The statute under which the defendant was prosecuted,
wreckless operation of a motor boat, was unconstitutionally
vague in that it permitted the Judge to find the defendant
guilty of wreckless operation on the basis of failing to yield
right-of-way and failing to keep a proper look-out, both of
which are, in fact, criminal violations of lesser severity.
WHEREFORE, the defendant requests that the Court reverse
the decision of the lower court finding the defendant not guilty
as charged.
DATED this

day of December, 1980.

ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for AppellantDefendant
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I

hereby ccrti f:i

P:-1i led a

U1:.!L

tL uc··

_,!\ l

correct

copy of the foregoing Grief of Appellant to the Summit
County Attorney's Office, Summit County Courti10use, Coalvii'
Utah 84107, on this the

day of December, 1980.

JEANNINE C.

DAMEW01'TH
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